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Recusal, or judicial disqualification, occurs when a judge abstains from a particular 
legal proceeding because of a personal conflict of interest. All levels of the judicial system 
and some administrative agencies in the United States apply the concept of recusal, but this 
study focuses on the United States Supreme Court.  Title 28 of the United States Code 
provides standards (not obligatory by legal means) on when Supreme Court Justices should 
recuse themselves.  But Supreme Court Justices are themselves the arbiters of their own 
recusal and often these substantive standards are not met.  The method of study applied is 
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I. INTRODUCTION 
 
 Rumors of partiality quickly turned into allegations of bias February when 
publicized documents showed just how strong the financial ties were between the 
lobbying groups working against the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act and the 
wife of Supreme Court Justice Clarence Thomas.  Just how much did Ginny Thomas earn 
as a lobbyist against President Obama’s healthcare bill?  The Washington Post obtained a 
copy of the letter signed by seventy-four House Democrats to Justice Thomas which says 
Ginny Thomas received $686,589 over a four year span from The Heritage Foundation, a 
prominent opponent of healthcare reform. Representative Anthony Weiner (D- NY) 
writes in the letter: 
The appearance of a conflict of interest merits recusal 
under federal law.  From what we have already seen, the 
line between your impartiality and you and your wife's 
financial stake in the overturn of healthcare reform is 
blurred.  Your spouse is advertising herself as a lobbyist 
who has "experience and connections" and appeals to 
clients who want a particular decision - they want to 
overturn health care reform.1 
 
Recusal, or judicial disqualification, occurs when a judge abstains from a particular legal 
proceeding because of a personal conflict of interest.  Is $686,589 paid by a lobbying 
group to the wife of a Supreme Court Justice enough of a financial stake to warrant a 
conflict of interest and ensuing judicial recusal?  The answer depends on point of view 
and interpretation of the judicial recusal statute.  According to today’s Supreme Court 
standard, the decision on whether to recuse oneself from a case is left exclusively in the 
                                                 
1
 Weiner, Anthony to Clarence Thomas, Washington, D.C., February 9, 2011, in Sonmez, Felicia, “House 
Democrats say Justice Thomas should recuse himself in health-care case,” The Washington Post, February 
9, 2011, http://voices.washingtonpost.com/44/2011/02/house-democrats-say-justice-th.html (accessed 
February 13, 2011). 
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hand of the Justice in question.  And since a justice is never up for reelection or 
reappointment and there is no veto on a Supreme Court vote, what check on the recusal 
power of the Supreme Court do the American people have?  The answer is next to 
nothing outside of impeachment, which has happened only once since our country’s birth, 
there are no repercussions at all.2  Under the United States Constitution a Supreme Court 
Justice is awarded a lifetime commission, one free of recusal mandates and ensuing 
political consequences.  They are themselves solely responsible for judging their ability to 
be impartial.  By examining parties to past cases and the history of past and current 
Justices, we will determine that impartiality is not adequately questioned and that there are 
clear and consistent flaws in the recusal system of the U.S. Supreme Court. 
 All levels of the judicial system and some administrative agencies in the United 
States apply the concept of recusal, but this paper will focus solely on the Supreme Court 
and particularly on recusal patterns of modern day Supreme Court justices.  Throughout 
this paper, while unraveling the complexities of recusal, I will continue to reference the 
Justice Thomas case study mentioned in the first paragraph.  I will also cite other 
controversial recusal affairs in order to prove that a consistent flaw exists.  Though it will 
obviously be impossible for me to study every instance of Supreme Court judicial recusal, 
it is necessary to note that of all the cases that have been brought before the high court, only 
a miniscule fraction are surrounded by recusal controversy.  As I continue in this paper, 
                                                 
2
 The first and only instance where a Supreme Court justice was subject to impeachment proceedings was 
in 1804.  The U.S. House of Representatives voted to impeach Samuel Chase, one of the signatories of the 
Declaration of Independence, on the grounds that his federalist background was influencing his Supreme 
Court opinions.  The Senate acquitted him of all charges. This helped establish the precedent of judicial 
independence and judicial review. (Dilliard, Irving, "Samuel Chase," In The Justices of the United States 
Supreme Court, 1789–1969: Their Lives and Major Opinions, ed. Leon Friedman and Fred L. Israel (New 
York: Chelsea House, 1969).) 
 
 3
keep in mind that I am making a study of only a slice of that miniscule fraction in 
contention.   
 There is some confusion on the procedure of Supreme Court judicial recusal: what 
is law and what is precedent?  First, there are two laws that govern judicial recusal.  Title 
28 of the United States Code provides the two standards, Section 144 and Section 455 (not 
obligatory by legal means) on when Supreme Court Justices should recuse themselves.3  
Section 144 titled “Bias or Prejudice of Judge” is extremely similar to Section 455 but 
applies exclusively to federal district court judges accordingly we will pay less attention to 
it for the purposes of this paper.4  Section 455 entitled “Disqualification of Justice, Judge, 
or Magistrate Judge” covers “actual bias,” “conflicts of interest” and “the appearance of 
bias” concerning “any justice, judge or magistrate judge of the United States.”5  It states 
that a judge should recuse himself/herself of his/her own accord when: his/her impartiality, 
personal bias, or prejudice is questioned concerning the case presented.6  Section 455 (a) 
deals with the appearance of impartiality: “any justice, judge or magistrate judge of the 
United States shall disqualify himself in any proceeding in which his partiality might 
reasonably be questioned.”7  The word “shall” bears all the weight in this statute, because 
no matter how strongly the grounds for recusal may be, disqualification is the prerogative 
of each individual justice and the decision of application is not up for review.8  Even if the 
eight other Justices, seventy-four house democrats, or anyone else of political significance 
directly petition Clarence Thomas to disqualify himself in Florida v. US when it reaches 
                                                 
3
 Grant Hammond, Judicial Recusal: Principles, Process and Problems (Oxford and Portland: Hart 
Publishing Ltd, 2009), 55. 
4
 Ibid., 56. 
5
 Ibid., 56. 
6
 Ibid., 56. 
7
 Ibid., 59. 
8
 Ibid., 63. 
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the Supreme Court, which it undoubtedly will, the decision to recuse remains arbitrarily 
his.9  
 Title 28 Section 455 (b) deals with conflicts of interest: (1) where he/she has 
personal knowledge of the evidence concerning the proceedings or has previously 
expressed an opinion on the case’s outcome (personal bias or prejudice); (2) where he/she 
has previously served as a lawyer or witness concerning the same case; (3) where he/she 
has come into contact with the matter while in government employment; (4) where he/she, 
spouse or child has a financial stake in the outcome of the case; and a prohibition of 
relationships, down to the third degree.10  In the letter to Clarence Thomas, House 
Democrats use Section 455 (b) (4) as the rationale for his recusal.   
 Proponents of the Justice’s decision to sit use the more specific particularities of 
Section 455 (b) (4) to defend their point of view: 
Section 455 means ownership of a legal or equitable interest, 
however small, or a relationship as director, adviser, or other 
participant in the affairs of a party.  The prohibition applies 
‘only if the outcome of the proceeding could substantially 
affect the value of the interest,’ but the proviso extends only 
to a mutual insurance company or a similar proprietary 
interest.11 
 
They argue that (1) The Heritage Foundation and Ginny Thomas’s previous employment is 
not a party in Florida v. U.S., (2) the outcome of the case would not substantially affect 
them, and (3) The Heritage Foundation is not a proprietary interest.  However, delving 
deeper into the context of Section 455 (b) (4) the democrats are wise to mention in their 
                                                 
9
 There are rare instances in U.S. Supreme Court history where Justices have collectively manipulated their 
votes in order to diminish the voting power of another. In the 1970s Justice William Douglas suffered a 
stroke and the other eight Justices met in secret to agree that they would not pass down a 5 – 4 judgment 
where Douglas was in the majority. (Ross E. Davies, “The Reluctant Recusants: Two Parables of Supreme 
Judicial Disqualification,” Green Bag 2d, Vol. 10, no. 1 (Autumn 2006), 88.) 
10
 Third degree relationships are present between individuals with 1/8 (12.5%) of a genetic link. Hammond, 
Judicial Recusal, 59. 
11
 Ibid., 59-60. 
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letter the significance that Thomas did not, perhaps purposefully, disclose his wife’s 
earnings.12 
 Supreme Court recusal precedent is just as ambiguous in relation to a Justice’s 
recusal decision as its legal counterparts.  First, there are nine justices on the Supreme 
Court and all nine perceive the text of Section 455 differently, as have the justices before 
them since the first federal judicial disqualification statute passed in 1792.13  Problems 
caused by the different interpretations of judicial recusal law are just the tip of the iceberg; 
recusal precedent is also extremely sensitive to the historical developments (formal and 
informal, i.e. official Supreme Court opinion) of the law.  Because of this, examining the 
most influential changes to Supreme Court recusal procedure will help us understand the 
context in which the precedent has developed.  The most crucial reshaping of recusal policy 
occurred in 1911, 1948, and 1974 and additionally interpreted by Supreme Court justices 
throughout the Court’s history, most recently in 1993.  
 In 1911 Congress enacted Section 144 of Title 28 U.S.C. enabling litigants to 
request a judicial disqualification motion, also known as an affidavit, based on a Justice’s 
personal bias or prejudice.14  Though Section 144 applies only to federal district court 
judges it is important to mention it when studying Supreme Court recusal policy because 
Section 144 was and can still be interpreted by the Supreme Court – conveying how the 
Supreme Court views recusal arbitration in relation to lower courts.  In 1921, Berger v. US, 
a World War I espionage case, reached the Supreme Court.  In this case, the German 
American petitioners who were accused of espionage filed a motion for the trial judge’s 
recusal based on statements the judge had allegedly said – for example, “one must have a 
                                                 
12
 Anthony Weiner to Clarence Thomas, Washington, D.C., February 9, 2011, in The Washington Post.  
13
 Hammond, Judicial Recusal, 14. 
14
 Ibid., 56. 
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very judicial mind, indeed, not to be prejudiced against the German Americans in this 
country.  Their hearts are reeking with disloyalty.”15  When the constitutional question of 
whether the judge should have recused himself (because he did not) reached the Supreme 
Court, the Justices decided that the affidavit, which Congress intended to have a 
peremptory effect, would actually have little influence on judicial disqualification.  The 
Court determined that a judge had the power to choose if the application for 
disqualification and accompanying affidavit were legally “sufficient,” meaning they had to 
have enough support and evidence that would give substance to the judge-in-question’s 
prejudice – that is to say “sufficient” in the opinion of the judge-in-question.16 
 Congress pushed through further developments in 1948, mostly affecting Section 
455.  A first modification eliminated the requirement that a party initiate the motion for 
recusal.  A second development was the addition of the word “substantial” in Section 455 
(b)(4), “only if the outcome of the proceeding could substantially affect the value of the 
interest.”17  These two changes worked against the peremptory-style changes made in 1911, 
widening the capacity for judicial discretion pertaining to recusal.  
 In 1993 the policy for recusals was altered in a less controversial way; the sitting 
Supreme Court Justices presented their individualized criteria for their own recusals.18  The 
impetus for such formal action on this subject started in 1974 when the text of U.S.C. 
Section 455 (a) was changed from “in the opinion of the judge” to “ might reasonably be 
questioned.”19 In the same year, the “duty to sit” criteria was eliminated by Congressional 
                                                 
15
 Berger v. United States, 255 U.S. 22 (1921). 
16
 Berger v. United States, 255 U.S. 33-34 (1921). 
17
 Hammond, Judicial Recusal, 58. 
18
 Stephen Wasby, “Issues in Judicial Recusal,” International Journal of Public Administration, 19(1),  
(New York: Marcel Dekker, Inc., 1996), 82. 
19
 Ibid., 89. 
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amendments which was aimed at widening the scope for judicial disqualification.20  The 
real driving force behind the 1993 recusal statements was the Court’s ruling in Liljeberg v 
Health Services Acquisition Corp (1988) which revolved around whether a judgment ought 
to be reversed if it is found out that a judge who decided the case was also unknowingly 
closely-connected financially to the outcome of the case.21 The Supreme Court ruled in a 5-
4 vote that U.S.C. Title 455 (a)’s language – “shall disqualify himself in any proceeding in 
which his partiality might reasonably be questioned”22 – refers to when a “reasonable 
person” would expect a judge to be aware of the questionable partiality, regardless of 
whether or not the judge himself knew circumstances were questionable.23   
 Even after Liljeberg, recusal issues continued to cause problems in lower courts 
and when combined with the perpetual question of why the Supreme Court was not held to 
the same standards as its subordinates, the 1993 “Statement of Recusal Policy” was 
inevitable. Seven Supreme Court Justices signed on to the Statement, issuing independent 
recusal standards they, as individuals, intended to uphold.24 This is one statement signed 
by only seven of the Justices. Though it’s written in a collaborative effort the Justices are 
independently aiming to uphold the policy within. “Statement of Recusal Policy” was 
signed by Rehnquist, Stevens, O’Connor, Scalia, Kennedy, Thomas, and Ginsburg.25 In 
                                                 
20
 Ibid., 91. 
21
 This case revolved around a federal judge in Louisiana, but is noted in this paper specifically because the 
opinion, written by Justice Stephens, institutes a new judicial recusal norm in regards to U.S.C. Title 28. 
Liljeberg v. Health Services Acquisition Corp., 486 U.S. 847 (1988). 
22
 Hammond, Judicial Recusal, 59. 
23
 John Paul Stevens delivered opinion in Liljeberg v. Health Services Acquisition Corp., 486 U.S. 847 
(1988). 
24
 Wasby, “Issues in Judicial Recusal,” 90. 
25
 David Souter and Harry Blackmun did not sign the agreement. (“Statement of Recusal Policy,” Supreme 
Court of the United States (Nov. 1, 1993) (on file with Hofstra Law Review), signed by Justices Rehnquist, 
Stevens, O’Connor, Scalia, Kennedy, Thomas and Ginsburg. ) 
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2005 Chief Justice Roberts adopted the policy as well.26  Of particular importance in the 
statement is the declaration that Title 28 Section 455 (b)(2) concerning his/her or relative’s 
legal association with the case:  
Current participation as lawyer, and not merely past 
involvement in earlier stages of the litigation, is required [for 
a Supreme Court Justice’s recusal]. A relative’s partnership 
status, or participation in earlier stages of the litigation, is 
relevant, therefore, only under one of two less specific 
provisions of Section 455, which require recusal when the 
judge knows that the relative has “an interest that could be 
substantially affected by the outcome of the proceeding,” 
Section 455 (b), or when for any reason the judge’s 
“impartiality might reasonably be questioned,” Section 455 
(a).27 
 
The terms of this statement formally, but not legally,28 bind each Justice to the policy that 
lawyer-partner relationships to a lawsuit only mandate recusal if financial interests are 
substantially affected, there is an appearance of partiality, or if the relation is personally 
participating in the representation of the firm, not just a member or partner to the 
representing firm.29  Though the change seems small, the precision of the statement 
nevertheless, substantially contributes to diminishing the vague nature of Supreme Court 
recusal policy. 
 The American Bar Association’s Code of Judicial Conduct and Model Code of 
Judicial Conduct is accredited little to none in regard to recusal policy.  Its significance is 
                                                 
26
 Hammond, Judicial Recusal, 66. 
27
 “Statement of Recusal Policy,” Supreme Court of the United States.  
28
 Supreme Court Justices as well as any federal judges are absolutely immune from suit for damages, 
Stump v Sparkman, 435 U.S. 349 (1978), therefore impeachment is the only way to hold a Justice officially 
accountable for not adhering to recusal policy. 
29
 Leslie W Abramson, “The Judge’s Relative is Affiliated with Counsel of Record: The Ethical Dilemma,” 
Hofstra Law Review, Vol 32: 1181 (2004), 
http://www.google.com/url?sa=t&source=web&cd=1&sqi=2&ved=0CBQQFjAA&url=http%3A%2F%2F
www.hofstra.edu%2FPDF%2Flaw_lawrev_abramson_vol32no4.pdf&rct=j&q=statement%20of%20recusal
%20policy%20with%20attachment%201994%20rehnquist&ei=YZSSTYW5G8Kctwfi8uVs&usg=AFQjC
NHpApB5-7BZZ-qz-J3_sw5s_vOjpg&cad=rja (accessed March 23, 2011), 1195. 
 9
more implied than it is officially recognized.  Outside of the Supreme Court, 49 of 50 U.S. 
states espouse moral regulations similar to those in the Model Code of Judicial Conduct, 
which includes that every judge should aim to avoid impropriety, the appearance of 
impropriety and any instance where the judge’s impartiality might reasonably be 
questioned.30  Additionally in 1973 the Judicial Conference of the United States, the 
principal policy making administration for the U.S. judiciary, adopted the Code of Judicial 
Conduct for United States Judges, now known as the Code of Conduct for United States 
Judges.31  The Code of Conduct is the federal equivalent of the ABA’s Model Code and it 
calls for compliance from all judges – delving deeper into particular instances of the 
appearance of a conflict of interest.32  Though it has provisions similar to Section 144 and 
Section 455 of U.S.C 28, it states clearly that “not every violation of the code should lead 
to disciplinary action” and so lends a hand to the ambiguity of Supreme Court recusal 
policy.33  
 Arguably the most incomprehensible problem with Supreme Court recusal policy 
is the Justice’s opinion of his/her eight counterparts.  After all, the power of a Justice rests 
in their power to vote and recusal is the only lawful way to remove an important vote from 
an evenly matched case.34  Thus it seems obvious that an opinion on a Justice’s recusal 
would depend largely on the politics within the Court, i.e. how evenly split the vote is 
going to be and how each Justice predicts his/her counterparts will vote.  Because the 
Supreme Court makes its decisions in private, the only way to study these recusal politics 
                                                 
30
 Grant Hammond, Judicial Recusal, 59. 
31
 U.S. Department of Justice, Judicial Conference of the United States, “Code of Conduct for United States 
Judges,” Guide to Judiciary Policy, Vol. 2A, Ch. 2 (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1973, 
revised 2009), 2. 
32
 Ibid., 3. 
33
 Ibid., 3. 
34
 Davies, “The Reluctant Recusants,” 86. 
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of the Supreme Court is to piece together information from memoirs and papers written by 
past Justices.35  One such paper was written October 20, 1975 by then Associate Justice 
Byron White (in office 1962 – 1993).  It was delivered to seven of the eight other Justices – 
those seven having been present at a private meeting which excluded the eighth, William 
Douglas.  The year before Douglas had suffered a serious stroke and the eight other Justices 
were afraid he was no longer competent, at least in the interim, to serve as a judge.36 In the 
letter White indicated the participants met on October 17 and discussed and came to the 
decision that (1) “the Court [would] not assign the writing of any opinions to Mr. Justice 
Douglas,” and (2) “they would not hand down any judgment arrived at by a 5-4 vote where 
Mr. Justice Douglas is in the majority.”37 Conceptually, the Justices were plainly and 
without regard for the legality of such measures, commandeering Congress’s authority to 
impeach and remove judges.  The other Justices felt Douglas should recuse himself and 
made the decision for him.38  
 The fact that instances like the one from the White letter have happened before 
signifies that real inconsistencies exist in Supreme Court recusal policy.  If a Justice is 
incapacitated, clearly there should be a more convenient route outside of Congressional 
impeachment that would remove him/her from office.  If judges of a lower court are forced 
to adhere to a particularized procedure, recusal or otherwise, the Supreme Court should as 
well, as they say, lead by example.  If a Justice is explicitly breaking recusal policy, as 
stated in the text of the Congressional amendments, there should be repercussions or at 
                                                 
35
 Justice deliberations are private because (1) it protects the Justices from public influence and sentiment 
and (2) deliberations do not necessarily reflect the final decision and opinion, which may not be written for 
weeks or months. (Epstein, Lee and Thomas G. Walker, Constitutional Law for a Changing America: 
Institutional Powers and Constraints, 7th Ed., Washington, DC: CQ Press (2011), 22. 
36
 Davies, “The Reluctant Recusants,” 88.) 
37
 Letter of October 20, 1975, reprinted in Dennis J. Hutchinson, The Man Who Once Was Whizzer White, 
(New York: Free Press, 1998), 463-65. 
38
 Davies, “The Reluctant Recusants,” 89. 
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least protocol for those actions.  When a Justice or multiple Justices determine a recusal is 
appropriate, there should be procedures in order to maintain the constitutional purpose and 
effectiveness of the Supreme Court.  In Section II of this paper I’ll outline more specific 
problems/inconsistencies with U.S.C. Title 28 Section 455, and in Section III I’ll examine 
the possibilities of change, if Congress decided to proceed with adjustments to the statute. 
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II. ANALYSIS 
 
This section is split into two parts. In part one I go in depth into specific case 
studies on Supreme Court judicial recusal examining specific circumstances, the justice’s 
past, the Supreme Court makeup at the time, recusal standards (formal and informal) at the 
time, and any other particulars I think necessary to mention.  I organize the analysis into 
categories based on established Congressional grounds for recusal and then arrange 
contentious cases under the appropriate recusal category.   In most cases, because of the 
distinctiveness of each recusal issue, it so happens that recusal precedent is almost always 
affected – and so I examine those effects as well. 
In part two I use data from The Supreme Court Database to help me examine how 
often a Supreme Court recusal is surrounded in controversy.  The Supreme Court Database 
has a comprehensive set of 200 facts about each case the Supreme Court has judged from 
1953 to 2009 and a less comprehensive set of similar facts about cases dating back to 
1946.39  Because of technicalities with the data I will be only running a statistical analysis 
on cases where less than nine judges participated in the vote.  When we arrive at part two I 
will explain my intentions with the data set more clearly.  
 
Part One: Case Studies 
 
i.  U.S.C. Title 28 Section 455 (a) 
 
                                                 
39
 The Supreme Court database is available online at http://scdb.wustl.edu. The lasted version, which I am 
using, was released February 11, 2011.   
 13
 Section 455 (a) deals with the appearance of impartiality: “any justice, judge or 
magistrate judge of the United States shall disqualify himself in any proceeding in which 
his partiality might reasonably be questioned.”40  The language in this section is clearly not 
the most comprehensive and so ample room exists for a Supreme Court Justice’s 
interpretation.  According to the text any type of past and/or current associations with 
parties or indirect participants in a Supreme Court docketed lawsuit may cause a recusal 
issue.  It is for this reason that past and current associations with parties to a docketed case 
are, in large part, found to be the most controversial recusal cases. Associations in this 
sense could mean a friendship with a litigant, professional history with a party, prior work 
on the case, previously stated bias, or a unique combination of them all.  
 
 (1) Current Supreme Court Justice Antonin Scalia declined to recuse himself in the 2004 
Cheney v United States District Court for the District of Columbia case in which his good 
friend, then Vice President Cheney, was a party.  After the Supreme Court had accepted 
and docketed the case, Justice Scalia accepted an invitation to fly with Cheney on a 
government plane to go on a hunting trip.  The party seeking Justice Scalia’s recusal 
referenced §455 (a) – saying the justice’s impartiality in this case “might reasonably be 
questioned.”41  Justice Scalia responded to the assertion in an issued Memorandum that his 
friendship with Cheney did not jeopardize his impartiality, that Supreme Court Justices can 
not be bribed by plane rides and hunting trips, and finished up by declaring the reality that 
many Justices make it onto the Supreme Court exactly because of friends in high places.42  
In addition to Scalia’s Memorandum, then Chief Justice William Rehnquist also issued an 
                                                 
40
 Grant Hammond, Judicial Recusal, 59. 
41
 Ibid., 4. 
42
 Ibid., 5. 
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opinion on the matter after he received a letter from two Senators voicing concerns about 
an appearance of impartiality with Scalia.43  Rehnquist replied saying each Justice decides 
for himself whether to recuse in a case; the way in which they come to that decision varies 
but that each Justice “strives to abide by the provisions of 28 U.S.C. Section 455, the law 
enacted by Congress dealing with the subject.”44  This recusal case is important because we 
see that an irrefutable friendship with a party to a case, no matter how current or strong, is 
not an irrefutable “appearance of bias.”  Because if it were, according to then Chief Justice 
Rehnquist, Scalia would have recused himself based on “the provisions of 28 U.S.C. 
Section 28 Section 455.” 
 
(2)  A similar recusal issue was present in the very politicized Supreme Court case related 
to the Watergate scandal of 1972.  United States v Nixon reached the Supreme Court in 
1974 to decide whether executive privilege could keep Nixon from handing over the 
incriminating audiotapes to the Special Prosecutor.45  Of the nine justices on the Court, 
Richard Nixon appointed four.  Of the four Nixon appointments, then Associate Justice 
William Rehnquist was the only one to recuse himself, citing his past association with the 
Nixon administration.46  This may be related to the fact that upon Nixon’s election and 
prior to serving on the Supreme Court, Rehnquist served as Assistant Attorney General of 
the Office of Legal Counsel.  If Rehnquist’s past association with the Nixon administration 
had enough of an impact that his impartiality might be questioned, one has to wonder if the 
                                                 
43
 Letter from Senators Patrick Leahy & Joseph I. Lieberman to Chief Justice William Rehnquist, Jan 22, 
2004, reprinted in “Irrecusable & Unconfirmable,” 7 Green Bag 2d, George Mason University Law and 
Economics Research Paper Series (2004), 277-279. 
44
 Letter from Chief Justice Rehnquist to Senator Patrick Leahy, Jan 26, 2004, reprinted in “Irrecusable & 
Unconfirmable,” 280. 
45
 Stanley L. Kutler, The Wars of Watergate, (London: W. W. Norton & Company, 1991), 508..  
46
 "Rehnquist recused himself in the case, citing his past association with the Nixon Administration."  
Kutler, The Wars of Watergate, 508. 
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other three Nixon appointees had strong associations with Nixon as well.47  Then Chief 
Justice Warren E. Burger, who was at one point on Nixon’s list for possible Vice 
Presidential candidates, was the only other Justice with a questionable recusal because of 
his friendship with the President.  The alleged fact that Burger was originally supposed to 
vote in favor of Nixon, fuels fire to the recusal issue, but because he steered his vote to the 
majority makes any recusal problem revolving around U.S. v Nixon moderate.48 The reality 
is that, for the most part, Supreme Court Justices interpret judicial recusal statute differently 
and this compounds the difficulties surrounding the development of a reliable Supreme 
Court judicial recusal precedent.  And on many occasions individual Justices alter their 
interpretations with time, making the recusal procedure seem even more ambiguous.  
Examining Laird v Tatum will be an example of just that complication. 
 
ii. U.S.C. Title 28 Section 455 (b) (1) 
 
Section 455 (b) (1) where he/she has personal knowledge of the evidence 
concerning the proceedings or has previously expressed an opinion on the case’s outcome 
(personal bias or prejudice); and a prohibition of relationships, down to the third degree.49 
Developments in regard to this area of Section 455 are few and far between, however 
controversy is rampant.  The issues revolve around the very fine line between opinion and 
prejudice.   According to the text any type of past and/or current viewpoint could or could 
                                                 
47
 The other three Nixon appointments besides Rehnquist were Warren E. Burger, Harry Blackmun, and 
Lewis F. Powell.  Prior to being appointed, Burger was on the U.S. Court of Appeals for the District of 
Columbia, Blackmun was on an 8th Circuit Judge and Powell was in private practice.  
48
 Kim Isaac Eisler, A Justice for All: William J. Brennan, Jr., and the decisions that transformed America 
(New York: Simon and Schuster, 1993), 251.  
49
 Third degree relationships are present between individuals with 1/8 (12.5%) of a genetic link.  
(Hammond, Judicial Recusal, 59.) 
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not be considered bias depending on the examiners point of view.  We will examine some 
of the comments past and current Justices have made concerning cases that have been 
argued in the Supreme Court.  
 
(1) Rehnquist’s “past association” recusal in U.S. v Nixon is attributed to his previous 
involvement as Assistant Attorney General of the Office of Legal Assistant for President 
Nixon.50  Similarly, Laird v Tatum (1972) was a case in which Rehnquist had prior 
associations because of his time as Assistant Attorney General.   The Office of Legal 
Counsel is in charge of providing legal advice to the Executive Branch agencies and the 
President through written opinions and oral advice.  By official assignment, the Assistant 
Attorney General is in charge of the Office of Legal Counsel and authorizing legal advice 
that is provided.51 While in this position Rehnquist gave testimony in front of Congress on 
whether or not he thought a Department of Defense surveillance scheme on “dissident” 
civilians critical of the Nixon administration and mostly the Vietnam War presented a 
constitutional issue.52 He also allegedly was a custodian of some of the digital evidence.53  
Obviously his participation in the Supreme Court’s decision on the constitutionality of the 
program was seen as controversial.  In a rare instance where a Justice publicly defends their 
decision to sit, Rehnquist said that his Congressional testimony expressed the position of 
                                                 
50
 Kutler, The Wars of Watergate, 508. 
51
 U.S. Department of Justice, “About the Office,” http://www.justice.gov/osg/ (Accessed March 9, 2011). 
52
 Jeffrey Stempel, “Chief William’s Ghost: The Problematic Persistence of the Duty to Sit,” Buffalo Law 
Review, vol. 57, (Buffalo Law Review, 2009) 
http://www.buffalolawreview.org/past_issues/57_3/Stempel%20Web%2057_3.pdf (accessed March 30, 
2011), 853.  
53
 Arthur John Keeffe, “Current Legal Literature: By What Standards Shall They Be Judged?” American 
Bar Association Journal, 60 A.B.A.J. (1974), 
http://heinonline.org/HOL/Page?handle=hein.journals/abaj60&div=275&g_sent=1&collection=journals 
(accessed March 31, 2011), 1582. 
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his client, the government, and not his own.54  However if we compare this recusal issue 
area to the U.S. v Nixon case, certainly Rehnquist’s professional capacity and involvement 
was similar in both because he held the same professional relationship to both; why then 
does he only recuse from one of the cases instead of both? 
 
iii. U.S.C. Title 28 Section 455 (b) (2) 
 
 Section 455 (b) (2) where he/she has previously served as a lawyer or witness 
concerning the same case; and a prohibition of relationships, down to the third degree.55 
The language in this section is actually one of the more defined in all of Section 455.  As I 
stated in the introduction, there has been Supreme Court interpretations into recusal when a 
Supreme Court Justice’s relative is affiliated with a case, but the actual Justice’s previous 
legal relationship to a case and recusal in relation to it, is still open to interpretation. 
Because several Justices were previously employed either in private legal practice or by the 
government, it is not uncommon that a case they worked on or participated in might reach 
the Supreme Court.  And because of the arbitrary recusal policy of the Supreme Court, 
some Justices may choose to participate in the vote while other Justices in a similar 
situation might not. 
 
(1)  Before joining the Supreme Court in 1967 Thurgood Marshall was Solicitor General 
for President Lyndon B. Johnson.  Because of this prior involvement in the executive 
                                                 
54
 Wasby, “Issues in Judicial Recusal,” 90. 
55
 Hammond, Judicial Recusal, 59. 
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branch, Marshall recused himself from about 40 percent of the cases in his first term.56  
Despite this rational for recusal, his most referenced and critically revered recusals were 
those related the National Association for the Advancement of Colored People (NAACP).  
Marshall’s involvement with the NAACP began in 1934 and he won his first of 29 
Supreme Court cases in 1940, the same year he was nominated to NAACP Chief 
Counsel.57  His extensive involvement as Chief Counsel with the association’s legal team, 
up until his appointment to United States Court of Appeals for the 2nd Circuit in 1961, was 
the basis for his routine recusal in cases concerning the NAACP.58  After his retirement in 
1991 and passing in 1993, his Supreme Court records were opened to the public at the 
Library of Congress revealing a letter of memorandum he sent to the other Justices 
describing and asking for advisement on his past and current recusal policy in relation to 
the NAACP.59   
His past practice had been, he said, to “routinely disqualify 
myself from all cases in which the NAACP has participated 
as a party or as an intervener.”  Enough time had passed, 
however, since he had left the NAASCP, “that continued 
adherence to this self-imposed blanket disqualification rule 
is no longer necessary.” And so he planned “in the future not 
to recuse myself in cases in which the NAACP is a party or 
an intervener, unless the circumstances of an individual case 
persuade me, as with all cases, to do otherwise.”60 
 
                                                 
56
 A rational like this falls under the recusal umbrella of Section 455 (b) (3).  (Adam Liptak, “When a 
Justice and a Case Are Too Close,” The New York Times, August 24, 2010,  
http://www.nytimes.com/2010/07/25/weekinreview/25liptak.html (accessed March 12, 2011).) 
57
 Mark Tushnet, “A Tribute to Justice Thurgood Marshall,” Stanford Law Review, vol. 44 (Summer, 
1992): 1277-1299, http://www.jstor.org/stable/1229060 (accessed 14 April 2011), 1277. 
58
 Thurgood Marshall College, “About Thurgood Marshall,” University of California San Diego, 
http://marshall.ucsd.edu/about/thurgood-marshall.html (accessed April 1, 2011). 
59
  Justice Thurgood Marshall, Memorandum to the Conference, Oct. 4, 1984, in Papers of Harry A. 
Blackmun, Library of Conress, Manuscript Division, box 1405, folder 14, reprinted in Davies, “The 
Reluctant Recusants,” 93-107. 
60
 Justice Thurgood Marshall quoted in Davies, “The Reluctant Recusants,” 81. 
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Not only did the eight other Justices condone the changes he proposed in his memorandum, 
Justice John Paul Stevens was “delighted.”61  This proves how judicious Justices can be 
when preparing to recuse, but of course it depends on the Justice.  Would Justice Marshall 
still have recused himself in so many cases if it was his wife who had worked for the 
NAACP instead of him, like the Thomas case study mentioned previously? 
 
iv.  U.S.C. Title 28 Section 455 (b) (3) 
 
Section 455 (b) (3) where he/she has come into contact with the matter while in 
government employment; and a prohibition of relationships, down to the third degree.62  
This subsection of text refers almost exclusively to a Justice’s previous government 
employment and recusing when government associated material is brought before the 
Supreme Court.  Depending on a Justice’s interpretation, this could mean government 
employment immediately preceding their Supreme Court nomination or it could mean 
government employment years, if not decades, before service.  This type of recusal would 
apply to many Justices dating back to the beginning of the Supreme Court.  Justices are 
especially likely to encounter such a case in their first couple years on the Supreme Court.  
Some examples would include Associate Justice William Rehnquist (previously Assistant 
Attorney General), Associate Justice Thurgood Marshall (previously Solicitor General), 
Chief Justice John Marshall (previously Secretary of State), Chief Justice Roger Taney 
                                                 
61
 Ibid., 82. 
62
 Hammond, Judicial Recusal, 59. 
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(previously Secretary of the Treasury), Associate Justice John McKinley (previously U.S. 
Senator), Chief Justice Charles Hughes (previously Secretary of State) and many more.63   
 
(1)  Current Associate Justice Elena Kagan is also a good example of when a Justice 
practices routine recusals in relation to prior legal association.  As the 112th Supreme Court 
Justice, Kagan came to the Court directly from her position as Solicitor General under the 
Obama administration, appointed by him in January 2009.64  The Solicitor General is in 
charge of representing the United States government’s case in those suits that reach the 
Supreme Court docket.65  The Solicitor General advises the executive branch and 
supervises litigation (including amicus filing and oral arguments) in the Supreme Court and 
lower federal courts. They also indirectly assist the Justices in selecting the docket by 
submitting opinions of the U.S. government to cases where, of course, the U.S. government 
is not a party.66  Though Kagan’s time as Solicitor General was short, she still played a 
vital role in many cases that will be argued in the 2010 – 2011 term.  That pre-judicial role 
fueled speculation into how she would choose to practice recusal, especially in comparison 
to the last Solicitor General appointed to the Supreme Court, Thurgood Marshall, who I 
examined earlier in this analysis.  For the 2010 – 2011 term, Kagan is recusing herself from 
25 out of 51 cases because she either assisted writing a brief or she was actively 
participating in a case while it was litigated in lower courts, according to the Washington 
                                                 
63
 A brief biography is provided for each Justice on the Federal Judicial Center website.  Federal Judicial 
Center, “History of the Federal Judiciary,” 
http://www.fjc.gov/servlet/nGetCourt?cid=0&order=c&ctype=sc&instate=na (accessed March 8, 2011). 
64
 Paul Kane and Robert Barnes, “ Senate confirms Elena Kagan’s nomination to Supreme Court,” The 
Washington Post, August 6, 2010, http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-
dyn/content/article/2010/08/05/AR2010080505247.html (accessed March 8, 2011). 
65
 U.S. Department of Justice, “About the Office.”  
66
 The Solicitor General would submit a petition for the Supreme Court to hear whichever case and the 
Court accepts about 70 percent to 80 percent of the cases the federal government petitions for.  (Epstein, 
Lee and Walker, Constitutional Law for a Changing America, 19.) 
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Post.67  The reputable SCOTUSblog.com also attributes the recusals to her filing a brief at 
the invitation of the Court of the U.S. government’s opinion, signing certiorari grants 
(memos she signed saying the U.S. government would not be involved), and recusing in 
cases where the United States is the petitioner.68  Because of the substantial amount of 
recusals in her first term some attorneys are going as far as holding out on applying for 
certiorari, so that they can be sure Kagan will sit the case.69  As prudent, or should I say 
logical and democratic, as Justice Kagan’s stance on Supreme Court recusal policy may be, 
her recusals are still largely unpredictable because of the arbitrary nature of the policy. 
 
v.  U.S.C. Title 28 Section 455 (b) (4)  
 
Section 455 (b) (4) where he/she, spouse or child has a financial stake in the 
outcome of the case; and a prohibition of relationships, down to the third degree.70  By 
now, the recusal issue most familiar with Section 455 (b) (4) is Clarence Thomas’s 
financial tie, and possible bias, related to Florida v. U.S.  Similarly, another Section 455 (b) 
(4) recusal controversy revolves around Justice Scalia and the gender bias class action 
lawsuit against Wal-Mart.   The recusal issue is whether or not Justice Scalia will 
participate in the case when his son’s law firm is representing Wal-Mart.71  However, in 
                                                 
67
 Robert Barnes, “Kagan’s recusals take her out of action in many of the Supreme Court’s cases,” The 
Washington Post, October 4, 2010, http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-
dyn/content/article/2010/10/03/AR2010100303890_2.html?sid=ST2010100303908 (accessed April 4, 
2011). 
68
 Tom Goldstein, “An update on recusal,” SCOTUSBlog.com, October 3, 2010,  
http://www.scotusblog.com/2010/10/an-update-on-recusal/ (accessed April 7, 2011). 
69
 Stephen R. Shapiro, legal director of the American Civil Liberties Union in Barnes, “Kagan’s recusals,” 
The Washington Post, October 4, 2010. 
70
 Hammond, Judicial Recusal,” 59. 
71
 “The Court’s Recusal Problem,” The New York Times, March 16, 2011, New York edition, A30. 
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many cases the financial stake is clear and ensuing Supreme Court recusals are not 
controversial.   
 
(1)  For example, current Supreme Court Chief Justice John Roberts Jr. used to own stock 
in Pfizer Inc., a New York-based drug maker.  Even though his stock was worth no more 
than $15,000, practically pennies compared to Ginny Thomas’s earnings from The 
Heritage Foundation, he routinely recused himself from lawsuits involving the company.  
Where it gets tricky is when we examine the financial stakes Justices previously had with a 
party to a case.  In this example, everything was running smoothly with Justice Roberts’ 
recusal regimen until it was announced that he sold his Pfizer stock holdings on August 31, 
2010.  Now he is set to sit on two Pfizer Inc. cases this term, according to a docket entry 
from September 2011.72  Can the appearance of bias be so easily shed in as little as a 
couple of months?  The period between Justice Roberts selling his company stock and then 
judging the Supreme Court case which includes Pfizer as the party is not a substantial 
period of time to disassociate the two.  In the same way that Justices like Elena Kagan and 
Thurgood Marshall recuse from cases they have associations with, recusal policy related to 
financial investments should be heavily exhibited as well, even six months or perhaps years 
after the fact – enough to remove the appearance that Justice Roberts may be bias.    
 
Part Two: Data Analysis 
 
                                                 
72
 Brent Kendall, “Chief Justice Roberts sells Pfizer shares,” The Wall Street Journal, September 28, 2010, 
http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424052748703882404575520133227381308.html (accessed April 5, 
2010).  
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As stated previously, part two of this section utilizes data from The Supreme Court 
Database, which organizes hundreds of facts about tens of thousands of cases dating all the 
way back to 1946.  The latest version of the Database was released February 11, 2011 and 
this is the version I will be using for my statistical analysis.73  I was unsure of what to focus 
on when I first encountered the vast range of Supreme Court data that was available.  I 
decided that I would only be looking at cases where a Justice did not participate in order to 
first, concentrate on less-controversial recusals and second, determine the more common 
grounds for recusal.  Doing this automatically eliminated tens of thousands of cases from 
my analysis, allowing me to focus on only the cases which include five, six, seven, or eight 
Supreme Court Justices.  At that point I still had over 2,000 cases in my data set and so to 
narrow down my analysis further I decided to make a random sample of forty cases.74  I 
chose forty cases instead of a higher or lower amount because of (1) brevity, being this 
paper has limits of its own, and (2) because I know that much of the case data, found in the 
Database and through other research methods, on these forty cases may lack information 
pertaining to the specific grounds for non-participation.  Thereafter I will sum up how often 
controversy surrounds Supreme Court recusals and why Supreme Court cases do not 
always have all nine Justices. 
The following table supplies the primary information regarding the forty randomly 
selected Supreme Court cases in which there were less than nine votes.  The table identifies 
a case number (which I assigned), lexis citation, date of decision, name, number of votes, 
                                                 
73
 The Supreme Court database is available online at http://scdb.wustl.edu.  
74
 Supreme Court Database, random sample of 40 cases where the number of votes is less than nine.  More 
detail on certain cases is provided in this paper’s endnotes.  
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recusant and reason for nonparticipation, if obtainable.75  All the information in the table is 
self-explanatory except for the “reason” column. 76  The explanations in the “reasons” 
column state either one of the five subsections of United States Code Title 28 Section 455, 
“per curiam,” or “no info,” all clarified below for convenience.77   
Reference List: 
§455 (a) – Justice disqualified himself in a proceeding where his partiality was 
reasonably questioned 
§455 (b)(1) – Justice had personal knowledge of the evidence concerning the 
proceedings or previously expressed an opinion on the case’s outcome 
§455 (b)(2) – Justice had previously served as a lawyer or witness concerning the 
same case 
§455 (b)(3) – Justice had come into contact with the matter while in government 
employment 
§455 (b)(4) – Justice, spouse or child had a financial stake in the outcome of the 
case 
per curiam – means that the court released an opinion on the case as a single entity 
with the participating and nonparticipating Justices acting anonymously. 
T/R – meaning “technical recusal;” that the nonparticipating Justice was not present 
for oral arguments, therefore decided not to participate in the decision 
                                                 
75
 For brevity’s sake I used the shortened case names for the table. The lexis citation is the U.S. Reporter 
Citation (usCite). The date of decision is defined as the day, month and year that the Supreme Court 
released its decision. The recusant(s) is the Justice that did not participate (I researched this independent of 
the Supreme Court Database).  
76
 The reasons for nonparticipation were obtained by me through research and my analysis thereof. 
77
 Section 455 (a) and (b) include prohibition of relationships, down to the third degree. 
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N/A – meaning “not applicable.”  This means that all the Justices were voting, none 
recusing, therefore there were only eight Justices on the Supreme Court 
when the case was being decided. 
J/D – meaning “jurisdictional dissent;” when the Justice disagrees with the Court’s 
assertion or denial of jurisdiction.  In The Supreme Court Database these are 
counted as nonparticipations.7879    
no info –  meaning “no information.”  I was unable to find information related to a 
reason why the Justice did not participate – either I found nothing or I found 
that they recused for unspecific reasons.80 
                                                 
78
 The Supreme Court Database, “Online Code Book,” http://scdb.wustl.edu/documentation.php?var=vote 
79
  The phrase jurisdictional dissent comes from the idea of justiciable, meaning the Supreme Court’s power 
is limited to “cases” and “controversies.”  Characteristics that make a case nonjusticiable are advisory 
opinions, collusive suits , mootness, ripeness, and political questions.  A Justice would write a jurisdictional 
dissent if he/she thought one of these  characteristics applied to a Supreme Court docketed case. (Epstein, 
Lee and Walker, Constitutional Law for a Changing America, 93-6.) 
80
 The reason why The Supreme Court Database does not have information on explanations for 
nonparticipation is because Supreme Court Justices are not required to disclose that information.  Instead, 
at the end of the opinion it will simply say, for example in U.S. v Nixon (1974), “Mr. Justice Rehnquist took 
no part in the consideration or decision of these cases.”  If this is the only information I can find on the 
recusal, then I will use “no info” under the “reason” column.  
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Case 
Number 
Lexis 
Citation 
Case Name Date of 
Decision 
Number 
of votes Recusant(s) Reason 
1 
1981 U.S. 
LEXIS 19 
NORTHWEST AIRLINES v. TRANS. 
WORKERS UNION 1981-Apr-20 8 Blackmun §455 (b)(2)i 
2 
1982 U.S. 
LEXIS 146 U.S. v. HOLLYWOOD MOTOR CAR CO. 1982-Jun-28 6 unknown per curiam 
3 
1982 U.S. 
LEXIS 6 
FIDELITY FEDERAL S & L v. DE LA 
CUESTA 1982-Jun-28 8 Powell no info 
4 
1982 U.S. 
LEXIS  163 
IMMIGRATION & NATURALIZATION 
SERV. v. MIRANDA 1982-Nov-08 8 unknown per curiam 
5 
1983 U.S. 
LEXIS 29 
AMER PAPER INST. v. AMER ELECTRIC 
POWER SERV.  
1983-May-
16 8 Powell no info 
6 
1983 U.S. 
LEXIS 117 
NORFOLK R. & HOUS. AUTH. v. C & P 
TELEPHONE OF VA 1983-Nov-01 8 Powell §455 (b)(3)ii 
7 
1984 U.S. 
LEXIS 64 
B. OF ED.,PARIS UNION SCHOOL DIST. 
NO. 95 v. VAIL 1984-Apr-23 8 Marshall 
§455 
(b)(1)iii 
8 
1984 U.S. 
LEXIS 124 
RUCKELSHAUS, ADMIN, U.S. EPA v. 
MONSANTO 1984-Jun-26 8 White no info 
9 
1984 U.S. 
LEXIS 94 HAWAII HOUSING AUTH. v. MIDKIFF 
1984-May-
30 8 Marshall 
§455 
(b)(1)iv 
10 
1985 U.S. 
LEXIS 5 
COMMODITY FUTURES TRADING COMM. 
v. WEINTRAUB 1985-Apr-29 8 Powell no info 
11 
1985 U.S. 
LEXIS 72 BENNETT v. NEW JERSEY 1985-Mar-19 8 Powell §455 (b)(3)v 
12 
1985 U.S. 
LEXIS 73 BENNETT v. KENTUCKY DEPT OF ED. 1985-Mar-19 8 Powell 
§455 
(b)(3)vi 
13 
1985 U.S. 
LEXIS 1524 
B. OF ED. OF OKLAHOMA CITY v. NAT. 
GAY TASK FORCE 1985-Mar-26 8 Powell 
§455 
(b)(3)vii 
14 
1986 U.S. 
LEXIS 101 AETNA LIFE INSURANCE CO. v. LAVOIE 1986-Apr-22 8 Stevens no info 
15 1986 U.S. PACIFIC GAS & ELECTRIC CO. v. PUBLIC 1986-Feb-25 8 Blackmun no info 
Table 2.1: 40 Instances of Supreme Court Justice Nonparticipation 
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LEXIS 1 UTILITIES OF CA 
16 
1986 U.S. 
LEXIS 87 BOWEN v. AMERICAN HOSPITAL ASS. 1986-Jun-09 8 Rehnquist 
§455 
(b)(4)viii 
17 
1986 U.S. 
LEXIS 88 
BOWEN v. MI ACADEMY OF FAMILY 
PHYSICIANS 1986-Jun-09 8 Rehnquist no info 
18 
1987 U.S. 
LEXIS 5190 
MULLINS COAL OF VA v. WORKERS' C.P., 
U.S. LABOR DEPT 1987-Dec-14 8 N/A N/Aix 
19 
1987 U.S. 
LEXIS 4815 CARPENTER et al. v. U.S. 1987-Nov-16 8 N/A N/Ax 
20 
1988 U.S. 
LEXIS 938 ETSI PIPELINE PROJECT v. MO 1988-Feb-23 8 Kennedy T/R 
21 
1988 U.S. 
LEXIS 946 BOWEN v. GALBREATH 1988-Feb-24 8 Kennedy T/R 
22 
1988 U.S. 
LEXIS 942 U.S. v. THOMAS ROBINSON, JR. 1988-Feb-24 8 Kennedy T/R 
23 
1988 U.S. 
LEXIS 2863 
CITY OF LAKEWOOD v. PLAIN DEALER 
PUBLISHING 1988-Jun-17 7 
Kennedy 
and 
Rehnquist 
T/R 
(Kennedy), 
no info 
(Rehnquist) 
24 
1988 U.S. 
LEXIS 2882 PIERCE v. UNDERWOOD 1988-Jun-27 8 Kennedy T/R 
25 
1988 U.S. 
LEXIS 3030 
COMMUNICATIONS WORKERS OF AM. v. 
BECK 1988-Jun-29 8 Kennedy T/R 
26 
1989 U.S. 
LEXIS 1738 AMERADA HESS v. N.J. TAXATION DIV. 1989-Apr-03 8 O’Connor no info 
27 
1991 U.S. 
LEXIS 7061 SOUTHWEST MARINE, INC. v. GIZONI 1991-Dec-04 8 Thomas T/R 
28 
1991 U.S. 
LEXIS 7262 HUNTER & JORDAN v. BRYANT, JR. 1991-Dec-16 7 
Thomas and 
unknown 
T/R 
(Thomas), 
per curiam 
(unknown) 
29 1991 U.S. FORD MOTOR CR. CO. v. FL. DEPT OF REV 1991-May- 8 O’Connor no info 
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LEXIS 2815 20 
30 
1991 U.S. 
LEXIS 6501 ZATKO v. CALIFORNIA 1991-Nov-04 8 Thomas T/R 
31 
1992 U.S. 
LEXIS 4537 
LUCAS v. SOUTH CAROLINA COASTAL 
COUNCIL 1992-Jun-29 8 Souter J/D 
32 
1994 U.S. 
LEXIS 3779 
MORGAN STANLEY v. PACIFIC MUTUAL 
LIFE INSUR. 
1994-May-
23 8 O’Connor §455 (a)xi 
33 
1998 U.S. 
LEXIS 4002 AT&T v. CENTRAL OFF. TELEPHONE 1998-Jun-15 8 O’Connor §455 (a)xii 
34 
1999 U.S. 
LEXIS 4200 MARYLAND v. DYSON 1999-Jun-21 7 
Breyer and 
Stevens J/Ds (both) 
35 
2003 U.S. 
LEXIS 8965 RAYTHEON COMPANY v. HERNANDEZ 2003-Dec-02 7 
Souter and 
Breyer 
no info 
(both) 
36 
2006 U.S. 
LEXIS 1818 OREGON v. GUZEK 2006-Feb-22 8 Alito T/R 
37 
2006 U.S. 
LEXIS 4675 HOUSE v. BELL, WARDEN 2006-Jun-12 8 Alito T/R 
38 
2006 U.S. 
LEXIS 2496 U.S. v. GRUBBS 2006-Mar-21 8 Alito T/R 
39 
2010 U.S. 
LEXIS 4971 
STOP THE BEACH RENOUR v. FL DEPT OF 
ENV PROT. 2010-Jun-17 8 Stevens 
§455 
(b)(4)xiii 
40 
2010 U.S. 
LEXIS 5540 DEMARCUS ALI SEARS v. UPTON 2010-Jun-29 7 N/A N/Axiv 
  29 
After examining Table 2.1 I simply compiled the recusal data that serves this 
paper’s main purpose – the reasons for nonparticipation – into Figure 2.1.81   
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Figure 2.1: Reasons for Nonparticipation
Occurrences
 
Right away, we see that the most common occurrence is “no information;” this is 
due to the difficulty encountered when trying to find the exact reason for recusal.  The next 
common occurrences are “technical recusals,” probably due to the high number of cases the 
Court hears relative to the amount of time the Court spends in transition between Justices.  
The next most common occurrence is Section 455 (b) (3), but at a substantially less 
common occurring rate.  Immediately this tells us that nonparticipation in the Supreme 
Court takes place less often because of recusal statute and more often because of 
technicalities with the Court system.  
                                                 
81
 The occurrences in Figure 2.1 add up to 44 instead of 40 because in Case Numbers 23, 28, 34, and 35 
there are two recusants, causing the number of reasons in the data set to be 44.  
  30 
Technical recusals, along with no information, not applicable, jurisdictional dissent, 
and per curiam, are not the focus of this paper but studying the rate at which they occur 
explains a lot about how The Supreme Court Database calculates its data on number of 
votes.  Just because 2,000 or so case decisions over the past half a century were made with 
less than nine votes, doesn’t mean every nonparticipation was because of a conflict of 
interest.  However, as previously established throughout this paper, Supreme Court recusal 
policy is not obligatory, so the Database also does not take into account cases that perhaps 
should but did not have less than nine votes because a conflict of interest of interest or 
appearance of bias. 
 
  31 
III. DISCUSSION 
 
Up until now, this paper has discussed the historic changes to Supreme Court 
recusal policy as developed through Congressional statutes and the judicial review 
subjected to them.  After careful analysis of specific recusal cases, inconsistencies between 
procedure and execution of United States Code 28 Section 455 are evident.  While the 
policy’s text is clearly written and the Justices swear themselves to it, their interpretations 
of the text are of real consequence.  As former Supreme Court Justice William Rehnquist 
declared during the Cheney v United States District Court for the District of Columbia 
recusal controversy about Associate Justice Antonin Scalia, “there is no formal procedure 
for Court review of the decision of a Justice in an individual case.  This is because it has 
long been settled that each Justice must decide such a question for himself.”82  If that 
wasn’t explicit enough for recusal critics, Rehnquist’s involvement in Laird v. Tatum is – 
giving testimony before Congress on the constitutionality of an executive program and then 
eventually reviewing the same program’s constitutionality before the Supreme Court.   
Controversies like these surrounding Supreme Court recusal policy are certainly not a new 
trend. 
Many Supreme Court recusal disputes are politically charged, especially in a 
polarized climate like today.  However, proponents on both sides of the political spectrum 
will still take notice to impropriety when evaluating nominees. The 1969 Senate rejection 
of Associate Justice Abe Fortas to the Chief Justice seat is evidence that the legislature is 
trying to keep a check on the Supreme Court’s power – deciding to reject the Fortas’ 
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nomination for many different reasons.  First, it was public knowledge that Fortas had 
consulted President Johnson on executive affairs numerous times during Fortas’ time as 
Associate Justice.83  Second, Fortas had received $15,000 for speaking at American 
University on different occasions – money raised for the university by corporations that 
might presumably argue in front of the Supreme Court one day.84  Third, it was also 
discovered in 1969 that Fortas signed a contract with a wealthy investor, agreeing to trade 
legal advice in exchange for lifetime yearly payments of $20,000.85  After he failed to gain 
the Chief Justice seat it became clear that Fortas would probably face impeachment and 
consequently he resigned from the Supreme Court.86 Similarly in 1969, President Nixon 
attempted to nominate Clement Haynsworth to the Supreme Court who also ended up 
being rejected by the Senate, conceivably for previously judging cases where he held a 
financial interest.87 Instances like these are ways in which the legislature reminds the 
Supreme Court that bad judicial behavior has its consequences; but are Justices only held 
accountable in politically charged circumstances?88  Impeachment might be more likely for 
Justice Thomas’s recusal case if the media paid as much attention to it as it did for Fortas – 
$686,589 is significantly more than $15,000.  
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In Cheney v United States District Court for the District of Columbia we concluded 
that the “appearance” of bias is a very loosely defined and heavily interpreted term.  
Associate Justice Scalia traveling and socializing with Dick Cheney, who was a party to a 
Supreme Court docketed case, does not signify an appearance of bias.  According to Scalia, 
friendships with parties to a case do not mean indicate possible nepotism or the 
“appearance” thereof.  Then Chief Justice Rehnquist also responded to the controversy, 
which fueled the fire, saying that every Justice strives to adhere to U.S.C. 28 and though 
the process may be different for each Justice, the recusal goals are the same.  However, 
Supreme Court recusal policy is extremely influenced by a Justice’s interpretation, so what 
seems a recusal goal for one is likely to be different for another.  Former Associate Justice 
Thurgood Marshall recused himself, more often than not, from NAACP cases between the 
time when he was nominated to the Supreme Court in 1967 until 1984, twenty-three years 
after leaving his post as NAACP Chief Counsel.  Looking back in time and being able to 
reference the 1984 memorandum, even Marshall’s decision to end his “self-imposed 
blanket disqualification rule”89 that year was occasionally renounced where “the 
circumstances of an individual case persuade me, as with all cases, to do otherwise.”90  
This helps us understand how dependent recusals are on a Justice’s reasoning and it acts as 
an excellent example of how quickly recusal precedent changes, even according to Justices 
themselves. 
Although the text of Congressionally mandated judicial recusal policy seems 
descriptive it’s clear that much of it depends on (1) Supreme Court interpretation, (2) 
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individual Justices’ interpretations (in the instance that their recusal is the one in question), 
(3) the political climate and (4) the particular “place” a Justice might be in their judicial 
mindset and constitutionally interpretive development.   
In regards to the first dependent variable, Supreme Court interpretation, the Court’s 
ruling in Liljeberg v Health Services Acquisition Corp (1988) is a good example.  The 
Supreme Court’s ruling that a judgment ought to be reversed if it is found out that the 
sitting judge who decided the case was also unknowingly closely connected financially to 
the outcome of the case.91  In the ruling the Supreme Court interpreted Section 455 (a)’s 
language – “might reasonably be questioned”92 to mean when a “reasonable person” would 
expect a recusal.93  This ambiguous “reasonable person” test could be seen as an expansive 
or contractive adjustment to recusal policy.  It is all up to interpretation, in the same way 
Section 455 (b)(4), “only if the outcome of the proceeding could substantially affect the 
value of the interest,” is all up for interpretation.94  Is Ginny Thomas’s $686,589 from a 
business indirectly affiliated to the healthcare bill a substantial interest or not? 
In regards to the second dependent variable, individual Supreme Court Justice 
interpretations, Associate Justice Elena Kagan provides a good example compared to her 
counterparts.  She is more disciplined in her recusal policy than other Justices, making the 
task of overturning lower court decisions more difficult especially on those where a split 
vote is predicted.95  The difference is how she interprets the policy compared to another, 
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plus before she was appointed she indicated her recusal from at least eleven cases – those in 
which she represented the U.S. government in her previous job as Solicitor General.96 
In regards to the third dependent variable, political climate, Associate Justice 
Kagan’s recusal habits are also of interest.  The relevance is intensified when combined 
with Associate Justice Thomas’s recusal habits.  As mentioned numerous times in this 
paper, many people are calling for Thomas to recuse himself when the Patient Protection 
and Affordable Care Act inevitably reached the Supreme Court judicature.  The same is 
being said about Kagan.  The state lawsuits against the healthcare bill began while Kagan 
was still Solicitor General, Kagan gave insight into the constitutionality of the bill during 
her Senate hearings and Kagan practically said how she would vote if she was to 
participate. 97  Much of the reasoning behind Thomas and Kagan’s refusal to recuse is 
prompted by the political climate clouding the case itself.  Universal healthcare in the 
United States finally came to fruition in 2010 and after decades of Presidents in 
pursuance thereof, it is ever more important than to the American government and 
citizens that the Supreme Court have every constitutional authority reviewing the 
legalities of the bill.  
In regards to the last dependent variable as to why judicial recusal policy is so 
unclear, two cases studied in Section II are the perfect example – Justice Rehnquist  (who 
was less restrained in his recusals than Justice Kagan) in Laird v. Tatum (1972) and U.S. v 
Nixon (1974). The reason Rehnquist divulged for not recusing himself in Laird v. Tatum 
was because his prior involvement as Assistant Attorney General on the government’s 
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behalf was purely professional and not of personal opinion.  In U.S. v Nixon, we don’t have 
the fortune of looking back at Rehnquist’s explicative reason for recusing himself other 
than the little rational he offered – “past association.”  However, advising the Nixon 
administration as Assistant Attorney General is in the government’s surveillance program 
is clearly a “past association” as well.  
 Finding a solution that tries to tackle every single inconsistency (not just those 
mentioned in this paper, but inconsistencies I may have failed to uncover) in Supreme 
Court recusal policy is a daunting task.  If the policy is tightened to the effect of prompting 
more judicial recusals, it’s more than possible that parties to a case would take advantage of 
it.  If Justices recuse themselves more often, the constitutional significance of having nine 
versus six voting on monumental cases, such as President Obama’s healthcare bill, would 
greatly diminish, in which case the Founding Fathers’ purpose of the United States 
Supreme Court would be nonexistent.  In the following recusal policy suggestions 
presented I examine that type of problem, as well as other weaknesses and strengths the 
suggestions may have if ever they were actually implemented into law. 
 One suggestion that is by no means unheard of in the policy circles of federal 
government is the idea that there is a “Justice in waiting.”  This Justice would most likely 
be a retired Justice or a Justice confirmed and awaiting a seat on the Court.  Thirty-nine 
states and the District of Columbia have a similar structure in place for its high courts in 
order for a full court hears each case.98  However this would cause bureaucratic problems 
with staff and possibly open up the floodgates for continuous and uncontrollable recusals. 
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 A less drastic change than the “Justice in waiting” system is to adopt American Bar 
Association Codes specific to Section 455.  For example, Section 455 (b) (2) could define 
the disqualification of a Justice being:  
When the judge knows that a lawyer in a proceeding is 
affiliated with a law firm in which a relative of the judge is a 
partner or has an ownership interest in the law firm. 
 
This describes the instances and appearances for recusal more narrowly than the current 
Title 28 text, and calls for recusal regardless of how strong the affiliation and/or 
ownership.99  A procedure like this would undoubtedly call for recusals in cases such as the 
Scalia – Wal-Mart recusal controversy. 
 A far simpler adjustment could be something as little as a personal statement 
written by the Justice in question on his decision to sit the case.  The statement would 
address the rational of those who submitted the motion to recuse and it would help develop 
a recusal precedent for the future.  Currently this suggest is the most realistic which is why 
Representatives Chris Murphy and Anthony Weiner are working on a bill based on it.100 
But of course, any new policy that encourages or ends up bringing about more 
frequent Supreme Court recusals challenges the constitutionality of the court, meaning the 
“consistency and balance of our judicial system,” according to two Harvard law 
professors.101  If the Constitution is as they say, a living document, then it is expected that 
changes will occur, just as slavery was abolished and amendments were passed.  Former 
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Associate Justice Thurgood Marshall agreed, saying that the Constitution was clearly not 
“forever ‘fixed’ at the Philadelphia Convention,” in light of how the Framers originally 
wanted life to be for minorities and women.102  Therefore it is just as likely and if not very 
reasonably expected that major changes to the Supreme Court will occur, just as the 
original number of Justices was established at six and eventually became today’s number of 
nine.103   
Former Chief Justice Rehnquist gave the best response regarding a Justice’s 
decision to sit on a case where there’s questionable partiality; that before a Justice is 
appointed to the Supreme Court they are likely to have voiced statements, comments, or 
opinions on any matter of subjects and when one day those subjects come before the Court, 
to appear ignorant on the matter “would be evidence of lack of qualification, not lack of 
bias.”104  No matter how controversial the statements, comments, or opinions on any matter 
may be, in the end, it would still be up to the Justice himself on whether to recuse 
himself/herself or not.  There are many cases where the line between conflict of interest and 
impartiality of Supreme Court Justices is blurred.  Justices are themselves solely 
responsible for judging their ability to be impartial but if Congress is moved to change the 
policy, their power of the Court’s jurisdiction and number of Justices can influence a great 
deal.105  However, policy implementation in Congress is an entirely different beast.   
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 Before joining the Supreme Court, Justice Blackmun worked for Dorsey & Whitney, LLP, a law firm 
representing Northwest Airlines.  “Dorsey History,” Dorsey & Whitney, LLP., 
http://www.dorsey.com/about/history/ (accessed April 12, 2011). 
ii
 City of Norfolk were making improvements to schools, streets and parks, and Justice Powell’s past 
employment with the Richmond School Board presented a conflict of interest.   
iii
 Justice Marshall was the lawyer who won the infamous Brown v. Board of Education, therefore his bias 
was already apparent when Board of Education v. Vail was placed on the Supreme Court docket. 
iv
 Before joining the Supreme Court, Justice Marshall was a lawyer to a case fighting for equality in 
publicly-financed housing projects; Sweatt v Painter 339 U.S. 629 (1950).  
v
 Case revolved around funds from Elementary and Secondary Education Act of 1965, which presented a 
conflict of interest because of Justice Powell’s history with Richmond School Board. 
vi
 Ibid. 
vii
 National School Boards Association submitted amicus curiae, which presented a conflict of interest 
because of Justice Powell’s history with Richmond School Board. 
viii
 Justice Rehnquist did not participate because his son-in-law’s firm works for American Hospital 
Association.  Al Kamen, “Court Strikes Down  ‘Baby Doe’ Rules; Administration Rebuffed on Mandating 
Care of Handicapped Infants,” The Washington Post, June 10, 1986. 
ix
 The period between Justice Lewis’s retirement and Justice Kennedy’s nomination lasted from June 1987 
to Feb 1988, therefore the Court only had eight Justices sitting at that time. 
x
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 John O'Connor, husband of Justice O’Connor, worked for Fennemore Craig law firm, which represents 
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“Fennemore Craig Celebrates 125 Years of Legal Service,” Fennemore Craig Attorneys, 
http://www.fclaw.com/about/history.cfm (accessed April 11, 2011). 
xiii
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conflict of interest.  Treanor, William “Steven’s Recusal Makes Difference in Florida Property Ruling,” 
The National Law Journal LegalTimes, June 17, 2010, http://legaltimes.typepad.com/blt/2010/06/stop-the-
beach-the-difference-a-recusal-can-make-.html (accessed April 15, 2011). 
xiv
 Stevens retired on June 29, 2010. 
